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Abstract: Humans uniquely form stimulus equivalence (SE) classes of abstract 
and unrelated stimuli, i.e. if taught to match A with B and B with C, they will 
spontaneously match B with A, and C with B, (the relation of symmetry), and A 
with C (transitivity). Other species do not do this.  The SE ability is possibly the 
consequence of a specific selection event in the Homo lineage. SE is of interest 
because it appears to demonstrate a facility that is core to symbolic behavior.  
Linguistic symbols, for example, are arbitrarily and symmetrically related to their 
referent such that the term banana has no resemblance to bananas but when 
processed can be used to discriminate bananas.  Equally when bananas are 
perceived the term banana is readily produced.  This relation is arguably the 
defining mark of symbolic representation.  In this paper I shall detail the SE 
phenomenon and argue that it is evidence for a cognitive device that I term a 
General Symbol Machine (GSM).  The GSM not only sets the background 
condition for subsequent linguistic evolution but also for other symbolic 
behaviors such as mathematical reasoning.  In so doing the GSM is not 
particularly domain-specific.  The apparent domain-specificity of, for example, 
natural language is a consequence of other computational developments.  This 
introduces complexity to evolutionary arguments about cognitive architecture. 
 
Keywords: Symbols; stimulus equivalence; learning; modularity; domain-
specific; canalization. 
 
————————————————————————————————— 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper will present a conditional argument about the emergence of 
symbolic communication, and as such will constitute a hypothesis about a part of 
the evolution of language.  Full, natural language is idiosyncratic to humans, for 
no other communication system exhibits the quality of recursion (Hauser, 
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Chomsky and Fitch, 2002) which is a property of syntax and undoubtedly the 
product of evolved cognitive machinery.  However, one of the premises of the 
conditional argument to be presented is that the recursive property of syntax is 
dependent upon having something over which to operate – in this case, symbols.  
Symbols have distinctive properties that are not seen in other animal 
communication systems, and as a consequence, require an evolutionary 
explanation of their own.  These properties will be described. 
The other premises of the conditional argument are about the kinds of 
explanation we should be seeking when theorizing about the evolution of 
language.  They might be termed epistemic premises or assumptions.  As with the 
initial assumption that recursion has to operate over something, I am asking the 
reader to act as if these assumptions are the case, and instead to focus their critical 
effort upon the conclusions I seek to defend. 
The first of these epistemic assumptions is a general one about cognitive 
science.  Cognitive science assumes that there are computational processes 
operating within the brain that causally explain input-output relations in 
organisms.  Much of cognitive science is about delivering functional descriptions 
of input-output relations, and trying to hypothesize the kind of algorithms that 
might deliver such regularity.  What is more, cognitive science aims to reduce 
high level functioning to theories that rely only upon dumb, unthinking 
mechanisms.  This paper is arguing about the characteristics of a dumb, 
unthinking mechanism that might underpin symbolic behavior.  
The second epistemic assumption is about evolutionary theorizing specifically.  
Some contemporary brands of evolutionary psychology have argued from 
observations of domain-specific adaptive behavior for domain-specific cognitive 
mechanisms that are responsible for that behavior (see Dickins, in press; Samuels, 
1998).  This is sometimes referred to as a modularity commitment (see below).  
One concern with this approach is that although there are sound reasons not to 
believe that the brain is a totally domain-general processor it is not clear that 
behavioural evidence is sufficient to carve cognition at its joints.  It is conceivable 
that one cognitive mechanism could instantiate a number of behaviors, and that 
one behavior could be the product of a number of mechanisms.  The behavioural 
data will not always allow you to decide.  Another concern is that for every novel 
mechanism hypothesized one is effectively hypothesizing a separate selection 
‘event’.  All too easily, one could have a theory of the evolution of cognition that 
relied upon an unlikely number of fortuitous mutations.  This paper sides with 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) in advocating a long, hard look at comparative 
evidence in order to be certain of behavioral discontinuities before advocating a 
novel cognition and attendant selection events.  This paper maintains that 
symbolic behavior is just such a discontinuity, and will speculate about what can 
be said with regard to the cognition that enables it [1]. 
The aspect of language evolution to be discussed, then, is the emergence of 
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symbolic communication given the preceding assumptions.  Communication will 
be defined, in line with the common view from behavioural ecology (see Hauser, 
1996), as the transfer of information from an actor to a reactor, such that the 
behavior of the reactor is changed.  This paper will argue that symbols convey a 
different order of information from more common signaling systems, and it is this 
that marks the discontinuity with other animal communication systems.  The 
paper provides a discussion of what symbols are in terms of this difference and it 
will outline Deacon’s (1997) hypothesis about the evolutionary transition to 
symbols within a communicative context to clarify this point. 
Deacon is focused upon in some detail for his work embodies the premises just 
discussed.  He grounds his hypothesis upon associative learning up until the point 
where symbols emerged, and as such Deacon adopts a parsimonious and 
comparative approach, albeit an abstract one.  It is at the point where symbols 
emerge that his hypothesis will then be augmented with a discussion about the 
properties of a putative General Symbol Machine (GSM) that allows the 
formation of stimulus equivalence classes.  This categorical ability is specific to 
humans and, it will be claimed, essential for symbolic behavior. 
 
Information 
 
Information is to be understood in terms of its role in reducing uncertainty.  
Through natural selection specific mechanisms will emerge that cause organisms 
to react to pertinent input.  For example, a frog whose retina is stimulated by a fly 
crossing its visual field will produce an appropriate tongue-flick response that will 
lead to eating.  The way in which the frog’s visual system and tongue-flick system 
etc. are constituted renders the visual input information – the frog’s systems can 
be in 1+n states and this input determines which of those states they will be in. 
The manner in which information is ‘transmitted’ can be organized as follows:  
Cues convey information by being permanently on, or constantly present, for 
example the yellow and black stripes of a wasp.  This is a continuous feature of a 
wasp’s abdomen and indicates that the wasp carries a dangerous sting – fatal to 
some organisms, a painful irritant to others.  This information reduces the 
uncertainty about whether or not to approach a wasp. 
Cues require no more than perceptual salience and then a learnt association to 
be freshly established.  The same is true of indices, or indexicals.  The difference 
between indices and cues is that indices indicate the presence of something by 
dint of a causal relationship with that thing, such that smoke is the index of fire, 
foaming about the mouth is the index of scurvy. 
Signals are unlike cues and indices.  A signal gives information about the 
changing presence of something and as such can be on or off.  Alarm calls are 
signals because they are only useful if on in the presence of danger and off in its 
absence.  There is a sense in which signals are similar to indexical information for 
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they are a consequence of the thing they convey information about (Deacon, 
1997; see below), but signals such as alarm calls are produced by an organism 
with a vested interest in the consequence of that signal being understood and 
acted upon.  In other words, signals are used communicatively within a social 
group and as such are more effortful and have costs and benefits associated with 
their production and comprehension.  For example, producing an alarm call 
makes one a target for the predator who is now aware of one’s location, and 
acting on an alarm call opens one to possible deception.  On the other hand, 
giving an alarm call can save your kin and acting on it can save your skin. 
A symbol represents an object, event or state of affairs.  Symbols are arbitrarily 
related to their referent, meaning that there is no natural relationship between a 
symbol and its referent.  This arbitrary relationship is established and maintained 
through social convention.  A symbol is also symmetrically related to its referent, 
such that the appropriate symbol can be produced in the presence of the referent 
and the appropriate referent can be produced or discriminated in the presence of 
the symbol.  This key property of symmetry was first noted by Saussure (see 
Hurford, 1989, for a discussion). 
The word <banana> is a symbol that refers to a certain kind of fruit.  There is 
nothing in the term <banana> that would indicate its referent naturally; its use is 
entirely the consequence of the conventional linguistic history of English speakers 
[2].  When a banana is seen the word <banana> can be produced, and when the 
word <banana> is uttered the attention of the hearer is drawn to that kind of fruit.  
If a token of this kind of fruit is not present then the hearer will have activated an 
internal conceptual representation of a [banana], in this way reference can be 
displaced temporally and spatially (see Figure 1 overleaf). 
The potential informational gains for organisms using symbols are great, for 
symbols allow the learning of others within a community to be transmitted and 
used by those without the direct experience.  Simply by arranging symbols 
referents can be alluded to and novel situations involving those referents can be 
presented in their absence.  In this way the reduction of uncertainty is spread 
beyond immediate domains. 
Deacon (1997) has collapsed and refined the above taxonomy of information-
bearing entities by proposing three main types – icons, indexicals and symbols – 
which owes much to the work of Charles Peirce, as Deacon makes clear. Icons are 
the significant addition to the above discussion, achieving informational content 
through bearing some similarity, for example, landscape paintings can be 
regarded as icons.  Deacon’s indexicals are the indices discussed above, however, 
he also includes signals within this kind due to their causal relationship with that 
which is signaled.  His view of symbols is consonant with that already discussed.  
Deacon sees the transition from signals (indexicals) to symbols as the first major 
transition to language, as breaking the “symbolic threshold”.  It is to this account 
that we now turn. 
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<banana> [banana] 
taste feel … 
 
Figure 1: A symbolic relationship – the symbol <banana> is attached 
symmetrically to both the fruit and the concept [banana], which in turn is 
associated with a number of banana-related events and experiences such as taste, 
touch etc.  At whichever point you access this categorical complex you can get to 
the other points – for example, on hearing the word <banana> you can accurately 
discriminate the fruit from other objects and this will also activate a conceptual 
schema. 
 
Deacon’s Symbolic Threshold 
 
Under the definition of symbols adopted by this paper one could argue for a 
simple associative model for establishing symbolic reference.  Our ancestors 
could simply have used novel vocalizations in the presence of certain objects and 
given enough stability and exposure an association would be formed between that 
vocalization and the object.  A name would have been created.  Deacon disagrees 
with such a pseudo-Skinnerian view, arguing that the correlation between 
symbols and their referents is not that frequent or strong in practice and as such, if 
symbols were merely associatively linked with their referents there is every 
chance that the relationship would quickly extinguish for most symbolic 
reference. What Deacon in fact believes is the somewhat counterintuitive claim 
that the ‘correspondence between (symbols) and objects is a secondary 
relationship, subordinate to a web of associative relationships of a quite different 
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sort, which even allows us to reference impossible things’ (1997, p. 70).  It is in 
order to clarify this claim that Deacon introduces the tripartite taxonomy of icon, 
index and symbol. 
The discussion of information sources could be used to endorse a passive view 
– an organism perceives an index and all of the information necessary to correctly 
orient the organism’s behavior is provided by this index.  It is just a question of 
downloading it.  Deacon takes the opposite, behaviorally grounded view. 
 
No particular objects are intrinsically icons, indices, or symbols.  
They are interpreted to be so, depending upon what is produced in 
response.  In simple terms, the differences between iconic, 
indexical, and symbolic relationships derive from regarding things 
either with respect to their form, their correlations with other 
things, or their involvement in systems of conventional 
relationships. (Deacon, 1997, p. 71) 
 
This view leads to the consequence that iconicity is not about brute similarity 
between the icon and the referent but is instead about the process ‘based on 
recognizing a similarity’ (Deacon, 1997, p. 71).  As Deacon says, we can be very 
liberal about what features we construe as similar and make an iconic relationship 
out of practically anything.  One can note similarities between a cheesecake and 
the moon, given enough inferential effort, but no one would claim a “natural” 
iconicity here.  Likewise, a temporal or physical contiguity does not necessarily 
instantiate an indexical relationship, and conventional usage does not instantiate a 
symbol – it is only when we begin to use them as indexicals or symbols that they 
are such.  An interpretive “decision” has to be made in each instance. 
A consequence of this processing view is that we can begin to see the tripartite 
taxonomy as less defined.  Icons, indexicals and symbols are not mutually 
exclusive categories and the same entity can potentially do the work of all three.  
Indeed, Deacon claims that these three classes of information are mutually 
interdependent to some extent.  For example, we could imagine being in a foreign 
land and hearing a particular word used – <arnav> – on a number of occasions.  
As symbolic beings we might well realize that this is a symbol simply from the 
context in which the utterance is made but we would not have access to the 
conventions of what is, in fact, Hebrew linguistic culture and therefore we could 
not use the term symbolically.  None the less, we might also note that this symbol 
is often used in the presence of certain creatures and learn that this is at least a 
likely index of the presence of rabbits.  This guess will be heavily circumscribed 
by various assumptions about the level of categorization appropriate to the term 
but none the less, might covary sufficiently to facilitate some useful 
understanding.  In this example we can refer to the information lost by not being 
part of the appropriate symbolic culture – if we spoke Hebrew and English we 
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would know that <arnav> meant the same as <rabbit> and not the more generic, 
and holophrastic <rabbits are present>, or <long-eared mammals are present> etc.  
So, the difference between icon, indexical and symbol is to be understood in 
terms of different levels of interpretation and these levels are hierarchically 
organized.  In the <arnav> example, once symbolic understanding failed the 
strategy was to drop down to the next, indexical level and see what information 
we could use under the appropriate set of processes.  Deacon gives the following 
example: 
 
(As) human children become more competent and more 
experienced with written words, they gradually replace their iconic 
interpretations of these marks as just more writing with indexical 
interpretations supported by a recognition of certain regular 
correspondences to pictures and spoken sounds, and eventually use 
these as support for learning to interpret their symbolic meanings. 
(1997p. 74) 
 
Deacon uses this idea as an intuition pump to drive the hypothesis that symbols 
are dependent upon indexical reference and indexical reference is dependent upon 
iconic reference.  Could this hierarchical interdependence be the mark of an 
evolutionary transition to symbolic behavior and one based on simple learning 
behaviors? 
Deacon discusses the different interpretative processes underlying iconic, 
indexical and symbolic representation.  Iconic representation is the consequence 
of recognition, or of regarding the icon as like another thing.  Sometimes this 
requires absolutely no processing effort at all, and Deacon uses the example of a 
bird scanning the bark of a tree to find a moth.  The bird moves its head once – 
bark – twice – bark – thrice – bark, and so forth.  As the moth’s wings are very 
similarly patterned to the bark it gets missed.  The bird would have to be looking 
harder for dissimilarities, rather than maintaining a process of similarity checking, 
to get fed – and there are always dissimilarities.  To this extent the moth wings are 
iconic of the bark. 
The obvious line to take when discussing the processes underlying indexical 
reference would be to argue for a learning history establishing links between 
foaming mouths and scurvy etc.  However, as Deacon notes, many things can be 
said to have physical or temporal contiguity so there must be something more to 
this interpretative process.  Deacon claims that it is critically dependent upon 
iconic skills, as we would expect given the preceding argument.  He uses the 
example of smoke indicating fire: 
 
The smell of smoke brings to mind past similar experiences (by 
iconically representing them).  Each of these experiences comes to 
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mind because of their similarities to one another and to the present 
event.  But what is more, many of these past experiences also share 
other similarities.  On many of these occasions I also noticed 
something burning that was the source of the smoke, and in this 
way those experiences were icons of each other. (1997, p. 78) 
 
So the extra process that is placed on top of iconic processing is that of noting 
repeated correlations, in this case between smoke and fire.  The transition across 
the symbolic threshold is the next stage and this transition is, in Deacon’s view, 
the establishment of relationships between indexicals, in a similar fashion to that 
in which indexicals are constituted by relationships between icons.  In this way, 
symbols are not merely associatively linked to their referent.  However, symbols 
do retain their indexical properties as a consequence of the inter-relationships 
between symbols as used in linguistic practice.  Deacon exhorts us to think ‘of the 
way a dictionary or thesaurus works.  They each map one word onto other words.  
If this shared meaning breaks down between users … the reference will also fail’ 
(1997, p. 82).  The intensionality of a linguistic symbol or word is established and 
maintained by the word-word relations, whilst the indexical element or word-use 
provides the extension – word-word relations ‘allow words to be about indexical 
relationships’ (Deacon, 1997, p. 83).  Indeed, contextual information provided by 
words often supports our comprehension of new terms. 
How could this symbolic system establish itself in an ancestral population?  
Deacon’s claim is that what establishes a symbol-symbol relation is a form of 
insight learning.  He supports the notion by discussing child development and lays 
claim to bursts of learning within the language domain that are indicative of 
ongoing insights.  It is at this point in Deacon’s theory that there is a gap to be 
filled.  
 
Inferential Effort 
 
The standard view of language acquisition in modern human infants is that 
much of it is governed by innate mechanisms.  For syntactic elements of language 
these mechanisms are highly structured modular devices that effectively impose a 
set of principles on a child’s learning of their native tongue.  For word learning – 
i.e. basic symbol acquisition – there is less evidence of a specific device, and 
instead much discussion about canalizing learning with a number of innate 
constraints, such as a whole-object bias, sensitivity to ostensive cues, novel 
objects and novel speech sounds (Bloom and Markson, 1998).  These constraints 
triangulate the referent to which a given word is related such that an infant hears 
the novel sound being uttered by an adult, looks to ascertain the direction of 
attention (primarily from gaze direction), fixes the new object and assumes the 
word refers to that whole object. 
Evolutionary Psychology – ISSN 1474-7049 – Volume 1. 2003. 199
General Symbol Machines: The First Stage in the Evolution of Symbolic Communication 
It would appear that word learning does rely upon associative learning, but this 
learning is heavily directed in order to deliver specific associations.  Deacon 
would argue that initially words are acquired as indices and only later do they 
gain intensional properties once symbol-symbol relations are established.  What is 
surprising is the speed with which children acquire words and the lack of explicit 
associative training that they receive, specifically negative training.  To some 
extent the canalization argument will account for this effect, for it reduces the 
number of possible associations that can be made to “sound x” goes with “whole 
object y”, but under normal associative learning paradigms one might expect a 
few trials to be undertaken before such a novel link is made (see below). 
It would appear reasonable to look at the kinds of associative learning that 
might be operating under the canalizing constraints.  Some discussion of the 
nature of the learning might actually enable us to say something more about the 
inferential effort required to interpret something as a symbol. 
Using a straightforward matching-to-sample (MTS) paradigm with abstract 
stimuli Sidman (1971, 1986, and 1994) was able to demonstrate a number of 
emergent relational properties in human participants.  A simple MTS procedure 
consists of a training phase and then a test phase.  In the training phase 
participants are taught, through feedback, to pair abstract and unrelated stimuli 
according to an undisclosed pattern.  The experimenter might have three sets (A, 
B and C) each of three stimuli (1, 2, and 3; see Figure 2a) and would train A1-B1 
(which means that in the presence of sample stimulus A1 the comparison stimulus 
B1 should be selected from B1, B2, and B3), and A2-B2 and A3-B3; and then B1-
C1, B2-C2, and B3-C3. 
 
Figure 2a: Nine abstract stimuli for use in the formation of three three-member 
stimulus equivalence classes.  The classes to be formed are A1-B1-C1, A2-B2-
C2, and A3-B3-C3.  In this example characters from the Klingon alphabet have 
been used.  None of the characters have a natural relationship within their 
categories. 
 
 A B C 
    
 
1   
 
2 
 
3  
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Figure 2b: A test of A1-A1 identity (with outlined correct response) 
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Figure 2c: A test of B1-A1 symmetry (with outlined correct response) 
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Figure 2d: A test of A1-C1 transitivity (with outlined correct response) 
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Comparisons
  
 
 
Figure 2e: A test of full C1-A1 equivalence (with outlined correct response) 
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In the test phase participants receive no feedback and are tested on a number of 
trained and untrained relations between the stimuli in a random order.  The key 
tested but untrained relations are: 
 
1. Identity (Figure 2b) – for example, A1 is presented as a sample and the 
participant must choose A1 from  A1, A2, and A3 (A1-A1); 
2. Symmetry (Figure 2c) – for example, B1 is presented as a sample and the 
participant has to choose A1 from A1, A2, and A3 (B1-A1) thereby reversing the 
trained relation; 
3. Transitivity (Figure 2d) – for example, A1 is presented as a sample and 
the participant has to choose C1 from C1, C2, and C3 (A1-C1) thereby combining 
two trained relations at their common node, in this case B1; 
4. The equivalence relation (Figure 2e) – for example, C1 is presented as a 
sample and the participant has to choose A1 from A1, A2, and A3 (A1-C1) 
thereby combining two trained relations at their common node, in this case B1, 
and reversing them. 
 
When a participant is able to produce all of these untrained relations from the 
set of stimuli they are said to be in possession of a mathematical equivalence set, 
sometimes referred to as a stimulus equivalence class (Figure 3a and b). 
 
Figure 3a: The stimulus equivalence class paradigm.  The trained relations are 
represented by the dotted lines.  All other relations are emergent, with no training. 
 
 
 
A
B C
 
 
This phenomenon is of great interest because the emergent relations are 
completely untrained and occur after some very simple associative learning.  Of 
particular interest is the fact that this is done using arbitrary and unrelated stimuli, 
which is a property of a symbol with relation to its referent, and this link is turned 
into a symmetrical one apparently spontaneously, which is also a symbol 
property. 
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Figure 3b:  A stimulus equivalence class of Klingon characters, as trained in 
Figure 2.  The trained relations are represented by the dotted lines.  All other 
relations are emergent, with no training.  Compare with Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fact that most vertebrate species can acquire the basic trained relations, 
but, with one or two possible exceptions (Schusterman and Kastak 1993), humans 
are the only species that can acquire the full set of equivalence relations is a 
tantalizing hint that this ability might be linked to language.  Furthermore, pre-
linguistic infants and those without a linguistic capacity appear unable to form 
equivalence classes (Barnes et al., 1990; Devany et al., 1986) although some 
researchers argue against this (Carr et al., 2000).  Finally, D. W. Dickins et al. 
(2001) conducted an fMRI study on stimulus equivalence class formation that 
showed significant activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and activity in 
parietal and other regions.  The speed and accuracy of response on tests of trained 
relations and transitivity was found to be positively associated with the degree of 
left lateralization across the group of participants. There was no Broca’s 
activation whatsoever, despite the use of readily nameable stimuli in this 
experiment which suggests that no sub-vocalization was occurring during the 
tasks.  Sub-vocalization of this sort is something that Horne and Lowe (1996) 
have attributed to the ontogenetic causes of stimulus equivalence class formation, 
which they see as a consequence of language (see below).  Whilst not conclusive 
evidence for this ability coming under separate control from the language faculty 
as a whole it certainly suggests a more general order of cognitive functioning for 
stimulus equivalence processes. 
If symbols are part of a stimulus equivalence class what is the exact nature of 
the relation?  Infants learn a sound-to-object relation, and not an object-to-sound 
relation.  The ability to use this symmetrically is a part of the full equivalence 
relation.  It is also likely that infants already have a notion of the indices of the 
named object.  These indices will also be treated symmetrically (although they 
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may be grouped under a concept – see Figure 1).  Place (1995) has argued that an 
equivalence class consisting of a name, an object and at least one index of that 
object is the core of a conceptual representation of that object.  Deacon would add 
that once the name in a particular equivalence class is associated with the names 
for others then a set of higher-order classes could be formed.  Thus hearing a 
name would stimulate a vast set of associations between classes and conjure up 
many possible extensions. So, stimulus equivalence class formation potentially 
provides symmetry, the core symbolic property, and later on symbol-symbol 
relations. 
Stimulus equivalence classes are categories.  A vocalization within an 
equivalence class will evoke all the other aspects of that category.  It would 
appear that we assume equivalence class categories under the very specific 
conditions invoked by an MTS schedule, but stimulus equivalence class formation 
is potentially the product of a cognitive mechanism with fairly indiscriminate 
application.  This mechanism is delivering relations between previously unrelated 
stimuli, of any kind, and as such cannot be relying on straightforward associative 
learning – even though it is predicated upon early trained associations between 
some stimuli.  This mechanism could be described as doing inferential work, for it 
allows the organism to go beyond the data presented.  As we have already seen, 
Deacon believes that the kind of information one infers from a situation is 
dependent upon the interpretative effort one makes.  The mechanism 
underpinning stimulus equivalence class formation could afford the effort 
required to break through the symbolic threshold. 
 
Evolved mechanisms and a General Symbol Machine 
 
The standard view from evolutionary cognitive science is that natural selection 
has led to a modular cognitive architecture (Cummins et al, 2003; Dickins, in 
press; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992).  Modules are to be thought of as domain-
specific packages of computations and/or representations, the domains being set 
by ancestral adaptive problems (Samuels, 1998).  This means that some modules 
are highly content based, others highly process based and some are both process 
and content based.  The obvious question to ask is whether we can conceive of the 
mechanism delivering stimulus equivalence class formation as a symbol-
producing module.  We might call this a General Symbol Machine (GSM) given 
its ability to form relations between any kind of stimuli. 
Any content of a module that is established through natural selection has a 
truth-value such that it matches a real contingent problem in the world at the time 
of selection.  The putative GSM is odd because it is a module that enables 
symbols to be formed and as such has no content, merely algorithms, or 
processes.  Symbols have the adaptive advantages suggested above, but there is 
no sense in which symbols were out there in the world to provide a selection 
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pressure and in turn create a module with internal and veridical representations of 
the symbols in the world.  Instead, as we are discussing the selection of a process, 
the GSM could only be a form of computational module.  This means that a GSM 
is an inference machine of sorts, a hypothesis imposition device that looks for 
symbolic (equivalence) relations that might be of use in order to further reduce 
prior uncertainty.  Thus under this model, a GSM running on stimulus 
equivalence principles sets up the symbolic relation as a hypothesis and this is 
subsequently tested. 
The successful attachment of a vocalization to an object, and consequently to 
the indices of that object, establishes an equivalence class that is empirically 
demonstrable.  The vocal attachment is entirely arbitrary in evolutionary terms, 
but in ontogenetic terms it is not for it is an established fact of the linguistic 
community and there to be learnt.  Nonetheless, once the attachment is made 
categorical work can be done.  But the mechanism that enables this, a GSM, 
simply forms equivalence classes between any stimuli that are presented in a 
specific way.  As such it assumes the existence of a kind of category.  The 
likelihood of this assumption being instrumental must have been high in ancestral 
times, hence the selection of the process. 
Any symbol relations established by a GSM might be of use to other 
processing systems.  An entailment of the GSM hypothesis is that the 
evolutionary emergence of a GSM is a precursor to any other higher-order symbol 
processing.  A GSM will provide a rudimentary symbol that would have to be 
later refined by other linguistic mechanisms (predominantly syntactic) in order to 
be incorporated into a full natural language – for example, words have 
characteristics extra to the core symbol properties outlined, such as morphology.  
Equally, the symbols of a GSM could be fed into mathematical processes.  This is 
not a simplistic statement of the order “first came symbols, then came language” 
for it is undoubtedly the case that the onset of a functioning GSM would have 
effects upon extant cognitive systems and also would shape the possible selection 
future of hominid cognition.  A GSM would be more than a catalyst for it would 
alter the cognitive economy of hominids and the selection pressures they faced.  
As such a GSM would construct a particular cognitive niche for our ancestors (cf. 
Laland et al, 2000). 
Past discussions of modularity have focused upon domains such as social 
reasoning and the detection of cheats (Cosmides, 1989).  Domains of this order 
are very specific, dealing with a clear set of costs and benefits and a defined class 
of inputs.  A GSM is not of this order for it allows the indiscriminate formation of 
an equivalence class between any set of stimuli, but the nature of this process is 
clearly prescribed and as such cannot be regarded as a totally general learning 
mechanism.  But despite these prescriptions stimulus equivalence classes only 
emerge in the lab after exposure to many trained relation trials on an MTS 
paradigm.  This very fact might lead one to question the notion of a GSM 
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underpinning this learning – for one might expect such a mechanism to be fast 
especially if it underpins word acquisition in infants.  However, as described 
above, word acquisition is in fact the consequence of some specific canalizing 
constraints triangulating learning.  This learning effectively becomes a focused 
MTS procedure with explicit guidance as to which choices to make and one might 
expect this to speed up acquisition relative to our general assumptions about 
associative learning.  What this description of canalization does not provide is an 
explanation of how the symbolic relation of symmetry is formed, but the addition 
of a GSM hypothesis does. 
Within the stimulus equivalence literature there is debate about whether 
language is an ontogenetic precursor to the ability to form such classes (Horne 
and Lowe, 1996) or vice versa (Dickins and Dickins, 2001).  The language-first 
hypothesis rests on a Skinnerian view of language acquisition that fails to account 
for rapid acquisition.  However, Place (1995) refined this and suggested that 
language indeed leads to the stimulus equivalence ability in infants, but that once 
that ability is in place it speeds up later word acquisition.  Despite this innovation 
Place’s hypothesis fails to account for the establishment of symmetry in the first 
instance, arguing instead that all of the equivalence relations are somehow 
transferred from a Skinnerian training of initial words.  There is no evidence 
whatsoever to support Skinnerian learning of words in infants.  Under the GSM 
hypothesis stimulus equivalence has ontogenetic primacy and facilitates word 
acquisition. When stimulus equivalence classes are formed in the lab it is a 
lengthy procedure but here abstract stimuli are being used without any 
canalization – the task confronting the participant is as difficult as that 
confronting an infant with no innate constraining biases [3].  Furthermore, in the 
language situation an infant is busy forming full equivalence relations between a 
vocalization, an object, and indices of that object as well as other learnt symbols.  
This will greatly facilitate subsequent learning, as Deacon’s dictionary example 
suggested. 
To summarize, the putative GSM, as a mechanism that solely delivers stimulus 
equivalence classes, is not content based, it is a process, and it is not domain-
specific because we would appear to be able to form equivalence classes with any 
stimuli.  Given this the GSM is not a module.  However, the generality of 
stimulus equivalence class formation is a phenomenon noticed in the laboratory.  
If the relation between the ability to form stimulus equivalence classes and 
symbolic behavior is as suggested, then the addition of canalizing constraints 
completes the GSM, making it domain-specific.  One might wish to refer to the 
GSM as an indirectly exapted learning mechanism, such that the onset of other 
cognitive abilities augmented a fairly general learning ability (Dickins and 
Dickins, 2002).  
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Conclusion 
 
The evolutionary story might run as follows.  At some point in our ancestry we 
developed the ability to form stimulus equivalence classes.   This allowed 
primitive symbolic relations to be formed, which enabled a greater range of 
inferences to be made about categorical properties of the world and also set the 
stage for subsequent evolutionary changes leading to linguistic, mathematical and 
other symbol processing.  In the case of language, the learning situation for 
infants was further augmented by the onset of key canalizing biases that made the 
training phase for linguistic equivalence classes quicker and more accurate.  Some 
of these biases, such as the whole object bias, may have been in place already as a 
key categorical skill, but it is the completion of the full suite that led to the 
behaviors we see in modern humans. 
The GSM hypothesis that has been tentatively proposed here argues that the 
ability to form stimulus equivalence classes is a species-specific cognitive ability 
produced by a computational device with a delimited but reasonably general 
domain of operation.  The domain is simply that of any stimuli but the delimiting 
factor on the process is the presentation of those stimuli.  In the case of word 
acquisition this task is made simpler and more constrained by the existence of 
well-documented perceptual biases.  A GSM imposes inferences about category 
membership on the world and it allows arbitrary vocalizations to be incorporated 
into such categories such that they can do symbolic work.  What remains to be 
explained is how and why such arbitrary vocalizations were ever produced, but 
for now we have a candidate mechanism that, with further study, might provide 
an explanation of the rudiments of symbolic relations. 
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Notes 
 
1.  Readers might note that the definition of symbols given later in the paper 
conforms to the symbolic feats of some chimpanzees (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 
1993).  However, these feats are accomplished after many, many trials which 
arguably contain hidden operants (Sundberg, 1996).  Even if no operants are 
present, contra Sundberg, these accomplishments, although impressive, are unlike 
the symbolic competences of human infants that acquire symbols fast and with no 
training.  Infant acquisition is discussed later in the paper. 
2.  It is worth noting that there is nothing in the alarm calls of, for example, 
vervet monkeys that would indicate a given predator naturally.  Arbitrariness per 
se is not a key symbolic property – symmetry is.  None the less, the form of 
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arbitrariness associated with alarm calls is different from the kind established 
through social convention, for it has an innate component. 
3.  This is the same order of task confronting various chimpanzees – see 
footnote 1. 
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